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PART I
Climate Change and the Constitution
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Climate Change Class Actions in
Canada
Jasminka Kalajdzic*
“[O]ur common future, that of every Canadian community, depends on a healthy
environment.”1
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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2020, a divided 9th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the longrunning case, Juliana v. United States.2 The plaintiffs, 21 young citizens and an
*

Associate Professor, University of Windsor, Faculty of Law. I thank Sonya Molyneux
(Class of 2020) and Daniel Macdonald (Class of 2021) for their excellent research assistance
in a very short time, made more challenging by a pandemic. This paper was finalized in June
2020 and therefore does not discuss decisions released in the fall in three climate change
cases: La Rose v. Canada, [2020] F.C.J. No. 1037, 2020 FC 1008 (F.C.), Misdzi Yikh v.
Canada, [2020] F.C.J. No. 1109, 2020 FC 1059, and Mathur v. Ontario, [2020] O.J. No.
5061, 2020 ONSC 6918 (Ont. S.C.J.).
1

114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] S.C.J.
No. 42, 2001 SCC 40 at para. 1 (L’Heureux-Dubé J.).
2

Juliana v. United States (January 17, 2020), 18-36082, online: 9th Cir. <http://blogs2.
law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2020/
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environmental organization, had sued the U.S. president and various federal
agencies, claiming that their continued authorization and subsidization of fossil
fuels contributed to catastrophic climate change that was incompatible with
sustained human life. They argued that these harms constituted a violation of their
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and sought
declaratory relief as well as an injunction requiring the government to phase out
fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess carbon dioxide emissions.3 The appeals
court, like the District Court below, agreed with the plaintiffs that the evidence filed
“leaves little basis for denying that climate change is occurring at an increasingly
rapid pace” and that “this unprecedented rise stems from fossil fuel combustion and
will wreak havoc on the Earth’s climate if unchecked”.4 The Court also accepted the
plaintiffs’ expert evidence that “the federal government has long promoted fossil
fuel use despite knowing that it can cause catastrophic climate change”.5 In the end,
however, the majority concluded that the claims were not justiciable in that it was
beyond the power of the court to order, design or supervise the plaintiffs’ requested
remedy. The panel “reluctantly concluded that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to
the political branches or to the electorate at large”.6
The majority decision was rife with ironies and pyrrhic victories. The panel
agreed that the federal government had increased carbon dioxide emissions for five
decades despite knowing about the risks of fossil fuel use; nevertheless, the majority
found that the government was effectively immune from suit. The panel agreed that
the political branches of government had ignored the pleas of the plaintiffs and those
similarly situated to them7 — but still contended that their only recourse was to be
found in that very same political process. The defendant government did not dispute
20200117_docket-18-36082_opinion.pdf> [hereinafter “Juliana”]. In March 2020, the plaintiffs and several interveners filed for an en banc rehearing.
3

Juliana v. United States (January 17, 2020), 18-36082, at 12, online: 9th Cir.
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2020/20200117_docket-18-36082_opinion.pdf>.
4

Juliana v. United States (January 17, 2020), 18-36082, at 14, online: 9th Cir.
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2020/20200117_docket-18-36082_opinion.pdf>.
5

Juliana v. United States (January 17, 2020), 18-36082, at 11, online: 9th Cir.
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2020/20200117_docket-18-36082_opinion.pdf>.
6

Juliana v. United States (January 17, 2020), 18-36082, at 5, online: 9th Cir. <http://
blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/
2020/20200117_docket-18-36082_opinion.pdf>.
7

Juliana v. United States (January 17, 2020), 18-36082, at 31, online: 9th Cir.
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2020/20200117_docket-18-36082_opinion.pdf>.
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the facts of the plaintiffs’ claim at all, and still, the plaintiffs had no redress.8 It is,
as the dissenting judge noted, a decision that gives the government the “absolute and
unreviewable power to destroy the Nation”,9 and to do so knowingly.
A decision by a Quebec judge six months earlier served a different kind of pyrrhic
victory to a similar group of young citizen plaintiffs. In Environnement Jeunesse c.
Procureur général du Canada,10 a Montreal-based environmental organization
commenced a proposed class action against the Canadian government in the name
of all Quebecers under the age of 35, accusing the defendant of violating the sections
7 and 15 Charter11 rights of an entire generation by failing to adopt greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emission reduction targets sufficient to avoid cataclysmic climate change.
Justice Morrison of the Quebec Superior Court rejected the federal government’s
argument that the plaintiffs’ claim was not justiciable, stating that “the executive
branch of the Canadian government has the obligation not to act in such a way as
to harm the lives of individuals and the safety of their person”.12 In the end,
however, Morrison J. denied certification on the basis that the action was not
suitable for class-wide adjudication — in part, ironically, because limiting the class
to those under 35 was arbitrary given that climate change affects everyone.
Juliana and ENJEU each reflect the precarious state of constitutional climate
change litigation, the latest in a decades-long litigation agenda to hold governments
and corporations accountable for contributing to GHG emissions, and to raise
awareness about climate change as a key political and policy issue. The two cases
reveal the difficulties in getting the courts to act as a backstop when governmental
decision-making risks catastrophic injury to the entire planet. But they are not the
whole story. In other parts of the world, constitutional climate change litigation has
had more success and, doctrinally, persuasive arguments exist for their eventual
embrace by courts in Canada.13 Constitutional climate change litigation also shows
the promise of what has been called the “next generation” of climate change
litigation: litigation using a human rights framework that avoids some of the
limitations of first-generation climate change litigation that was narrowly focused on
8

Juliana v. United States (January 17, 2020), 18-36082, at 16, online: 9th Cir.
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2020/20200117_docket-18-36082_opinion.pdf>.
9

Juliana v. United States (January 17, 2020), 18-36082, at 33, online: 9th Cir.
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2020/20200117_docket-18-36082_opinion.pdf>.
10

[2019] J.Q. no 5940, 2019 QCCS 2885 (Que. S.C.) [hereinafter “ENJEU”].

11

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
12

Environnement Jeunesse c. Procureur général du Canada, [2019] J.Q. no 5940, 2019
QCCS 2885, at para. 64 (Que. S.C.), relying on Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985]
S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at para. 28 (S.C.C.).
13

Infra, Part IV.2.
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judicial review under environmental legislation.14 This new breed of climate change
litigation widens the constituency of climate justice advocates, raises the public
profile of the climate change issue and further accustoms courts to climate change
science. All of these outcomes increase the possibility of effecting transformative
legal and political change, even when cases do not produce immediate victories.
If climate justice activists are increasingly looking to litigation to produce the
policy changes that have eluded them in the political process, it is worth considering
all of the procedural and substantive tools traditionally available to public interest
lawyers. In this paper, I make a modest contribution to the growing literature on
climate change litigation by discussing one such procedural device: the class action.
Is a class action in this particular constitutional space viable? Might a collective
form of redress be preferable to other forms of litigation, in light of the collective
nature of the harm?
This paper proceeds in four parts. First and by way of background, I summarize
the types and extent of climate change litigation in Canada and internationally.
Second, I discuss Canadian class actions advancing constitutional claims, which
have recently surged after two decades of limited use. Third, I argue that a climate
change action founded on a breach of section 7 of the Charter would meet the test
for certification of a class action. Finally, I discuss the comparative advantages and
disadvantages of using the class action mechanism to combat climate injustice.
II. THE CURRENT STATE

OF

CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION

The existence and impacts of climate change are well documented, as is the
scientific consensus that human activity is its primary cause.15 Despite these facts,
states have failed to take any meaningful steps, let alone the urgent action scientists
have demanded to curb GHG emissions. Even admittedly weak emissions targets
have not been met in practice.16 Faced with widespread government intransigence,
14

Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky & Anita Foerster, “Shaping the ‘Next Generation’ of
Climate Change Litigation in Australia” (2017) 41:2 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 793.
15

The most authoritative and non-partisan sources are the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the UN Panel for assessing the science of climate change that
includes 195 member states. In one of its recent reports, the IPCC concluded that global
warming is likely to reach 1.5˚C above pre-industrial levels between 2030 and 2052 if it
continues to increase at the current rate, resulting in extreme temperatures in many regions,
increases in flooding in coastal regions and frequency of droughts in others: IPCC, 2018:
Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in
the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty, online: <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/>.
16

Nathalie J. Chalifour & Jessica Earle, “Feeling the Heat: Climate Litigation Under the
Canadian Charter’s Right to Life, Liberty, and Security of the Person” (2018) 42:4 Vermont
Law Review 689, at 704.
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some environmental activists turned to litigation as a tool to combat the climate
change crisis.17
“Climate change litigation” is a broad term that refers to strategic litigation before
domestic courts and international tribunals, all involving the use of various legal
doctrines in order to compel the reduction of GHG emissions or obtain compensation from those responsible for climate change-related harms.18 Beginning in the
1990s, the first generation of these cases focused on environmental assessment
challenges to government decision-making for failing to take climate change
considerations into account or sought to halt individual projects, like coal mining or
fracking, by seeking injunctive relief against private companies.19 These cases relied
for their success on the strength of underlying environmental legislation or courts’
receptiveness to common law nuisance claims, and resulted in modest improvements to compliance with environmental laws.
A second wave of climate change litigation looks to address climate change
directly, but unmoored from any statutory obligation to protect the environment;
rather, these claims use a rights-based approach to compel governments to mitigate
climate change or take steps to protect vulnerable communities facing its impacts.20
These strategies are necessary in light of the lack of a codified or common law
17

Some academics have suggested that climate change social movements turn to
litigation when political opportunities are weak: Chris Hilson, “UK Climate Change
Litigation: Between Hard and Soft Framing” in S. Farrall, T. Ahmed & D. French, eds.,
Criminological and Legal Consequences of Climate Change (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012),
47-61.
18

Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky & Anita Foerster, “Shaping the ‘Next Generation’ of
Climate Change Litigation in Australia” (2017) 41:2 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 793, at 794. David
Markell and J.B. Ruhl similarly define climate change litigation as any in which the “tribunal
decisions directly and expressly raise an issue of fact or law regarding the substance or policy
of climate change causes and impacts”: “An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the
Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?” (2012) 64 Fla. L. Rev. 15, at 27. See
also Chilenye Nwapi, “From Responsibility to Cost-Effectiveness to Litigation: The
Evolution of Climate Change Regulation and the Emergency of Climate Justice Litigation”
in Randall S. Abate, ed., Climate Justice: Case Studies in Global and Regional Governance
Challenges (Washington, DC: Environmental Law Institute, 2016) 517, at 531-32.
19

Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky & Anita Foerster, “Shaping the ‘Next Generation’ of
Climate Change Litigation in Australia” (2017) 41:2 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 793, at 803;
Randall S. Abate, “Atmospheric Trust Litigation in the United States: Pipe Dream or Pipeline
to Justice for Future Generations?” in Randall S. Abate, ed., Climate Justice: Case Studies in
Global and Regional Governance Challenges (Washington, DC: Environmental Law
Institute, 2016) 517, at 546-47.
20

International Bar Association, “Model Statute for Proceedings Challenging Government Failure to Act on Climate Change” (February 2020), at 3-5, online: <https://www.ibanet.org/
Climate-Change-Model-Statute.aspx>.
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substantive right to a sustainable environment, as is the case in Canada.21 Much has
been written on the human rights dimensions of climate change,22 and there is
explicit acknowledgment of the linkages between human rights and climate justice
in various international documents, including the Paris Agreement.23
Climate change litigation of all types has proliferated across at least 25
jurisdictions, with the greatest number of cases filed in the United States.24 Although
the Juliana case represents a blow for second-wave climate change litigation, cases
in other parts of the world have proven successful. The most notable: Urgenda, in
which the Dutch court found the national government owed a duty of care to limit
carbon emissions, and rejected the government’s arguments that their ineffective
action to reduce GHG emissions was non-justiciable or that their contribution to
global climate change was negligible;25 and Leghari, a novel action brought against
the Pakistani government, alleging its inaction on climate change violated the
constitutional rights — specifically, the right to life — of Pakistani citizens.26 Citing
domestic and international legal principles, the Lahore High Court determined that
21

Query the impact of the proposed Climate Change Accountability Act if it becomes law:
Bill C-215, An Act respecting Canada’s fulfillment of its greenhouse gas emissions reduction
obligations, 1st Sess., 43rd Parl., 2020 (first reading February 24, 2020).
22

The literature is vast. See, e.g., Sumudu Atapattu, Human Rights Approaches to
Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities (Routledge, 2018); Jacqueline Peel & Hari
M. Osofsky, “A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?” (2018) 7:1 Transnational
Environmental L. 37; Damilola S. Olawuyi, The Human Rights-Based Approach to Carbon
Finance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Tracey Skillington, Climate
Justice and Human Rights (Palgrave MacMillan, 2017); Sam Adelman, “Human Rights and
Climate Change”, in Gordon DiGiacomo, Human Rights: Current Issues and Controversies
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016); David Boyd, The Environmental Rights
Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights and the Environment (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011); Stephen Humphreys, ed., Human Rights
and Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Dinah Shelton,
“Litigating a Rights-Based Approach to Climate Change” (2009) Proceedings of the
International Conference on Human Rights and the Environment 211. See also reports
published by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, online: <https://www.ohchr.
org/EN/Issues/HRAndClimateChange/Pages/HRClimateChangeIndex.aspx>.
23

Preamble, Paris Agreement, UNFCC Conference of the Parties, 21st Sess., UN Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (December 12, 2015).
24

As of March 2017, the UN Environment Report on climate change litigation identified
654 cases in the U.S.: United Nations Environment Program, The Status of Climate Change
Litigation: A Global Review (2017), at 10.
25

Urgenda Foundation v. Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment),
Hague District Court, Chamber for Commercial Affairs, No C/09/456689 HA ZA 131396
(June 24, 2015), at para. 4.65; English translation available online: <http://www.urgenda.nl/
documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf>.
26

Leghari v. Pakistan (2015), WP No. 25501/201 (Punjab), at paras. 21, 24, 25.
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the state’s delay in implementing the Framework for the Implementation of Climate
Change Policy offended the fundamental rights of citizens and then fashioned a
novel remedy: the court first directed several government ministries to each
nominate “a climate change focal person” to help ensure the implementation of the
Framework, and to present a list of action points by a given date; it then created a
Climate Change Commission composed of representatives of key ministries, NGOs
and technical experts to monitor the government’s progress.27
According to the Sabin Center,28 22 climate change cases have been filed in
Canada, but this number includes regressive actions by industry and governments,
such as cases challenging government authority to impose green regulations and
three provinces’ carbon tax litigation.29 Of the 22 cases, only three employ a human
rights approach: ENJEU; an action brought by two houses of Wet’suwet’en
Indigenous groups;30 and La Rose, a claim filed on behalf of 15 youth over the
failure of the federal government to adopt a climate recovery plan.31 Only ENJEU
was brought as a proposed class action and is currently awaiting a hearing before the
Quebec Court of Appeal. The strengths of the plaintiffs’ appeal, and the likelihood
that other climate change class actions could be brought successfully elsewhere in
Canada, will be discussed in Part IV. Since such litigation will be premised on a
Charter breach, however, it is worth first revisiting the capacity of the class action
procedure to facilitate Charter litigation.
III. LITIGATING CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AS CLASS ACTIONS
“At first blush”, class proceedings appear to be an “ideal method of bringing
27

Leghari v. Pakistan (2015), WP No. 25501/201 (Punjab), at paras. 25-27. For a
discussion of these and other climate change actions internationally, see Jacqueline Peel, Hari
Osofsky & Anita Foerster, “Shaping the ‘Next Generation’ of Climate Change Litigation in
Australia” (2017) 41:2 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 793.
28

The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law develops legal techniques to fight climate
change, trains law students and lawyers in their use, and provides the public with up-to-date
resources on key topics in climate law and regulation. It supports a climate change litigation
database that tracks climate change litigation in the U.S. and worldwide: <https://
climate.law.columbia.edu/>.
29

The Supreme Court of Canada was scheduled to hear appeals of the Saskatchewan and
Ontario Court of Appeal rulings in the carbon tax litigation on March 24 and 25, 2020, but
the hearings were adjourned to mid-September 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic:
<https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=38663>.
30

Lho’imggin et al. v. Canada (Statement of Claim), online: <http://blogs2.law.columbia.
edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2020/
20200210_NA_complaint-1.pdf>.
31

Misdzi Yikh v. Canada (Statement of Claim), online: <http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/
climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2019/20191025_
T-1750-19_complaint.pdf> [hereinafter “La Rose”].
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constitutional challenges to laws, practices or policies of general application”.32 By
definition, constitutional challenges involve issues that are common to similarly
situated plaintiffs. They also typically focus on the behaviour of the defendant or the
systemic impact of government action. They can pit citizens against well-resourced
governments — precisely the kind of power imbalance that class proceedings were
designed to redress.33
Whatever the initial hopes of using class actions to advance claims on behalf of
marginalized groups seeking systemic change, the reality of Canada’s experience
has been disappointing to many human rights activists. Of the 1,500 or so class
actions commenced in Ontario since 1993, only 7 per cent involved cases against the
Crown, of which Charter claims comprised only a small part.34 Private law cases
make up the vast majority of class actions.35
The reasons for the relative paucity of public law (specifically Charter-based)
class actions are primarily threefold: policy, jurisprudence and pragmatic realities
have stifled the development of constitutional class actions. First, some courts and
commentators argue that class actions against the Crown distort sound public policy
or are an end-run around administrative law and judicial review of government
action.36 Historical and cultural context goes some way to explaining this reticence
toward private enforcement of public law: as compared to our American counterparts, Canada has placed greater faith in administrative agencies and tribunals to
adjudicate human rights and other public law claims.37
32

Andre Lokan & Christopher Dassios, Constitutional Litigation in Canada (Toronto:
Carswell, 2006), at 5-18.
33

Joseph Arvay & David Wu, “Class Actions and the Charter” (Paper delivered at the
14th National Symposium on Class Actions, Toronto, April 6-7, 2017), at 1 [unpublished].
34

Law Commission of Ontario, Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms:
Final Report (Toronto: July 2019), at 23. The “Crown Liability” category includes negligence
claims, institutional abuse cases founded on common law duties, as well as allegations of
Charter infringements: Law Commission of Ontario, Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences
and Reforms: Consultation Paper (Toronto: March 2018), at 49.
35

In surveys of lawyers taken in 2009 and 2014, medical/pharmaceutical, Competition
Act, product liability and securities cases accounted for over 60 per cent of all pending class
actions. With the addition of the consumer product and mass tort categories, private law class
actions account for at least 75 per cent of all cases. Jasminka Kalajdzic, Class Actions in
Canada: The Promise and Reality of Access to Justice (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2018), at 17-18.
36

L. Sossin, “Class Actions Against the Crown, or Administrative Law by Other Means”
(2006) 43 C.B.L.J. 380; R. Douglas Elliott, “Fringe Benefits: Class Actions for Marginalized
People in Canada” (2011) 53 S.C.L.R. (2d) 221, at 222.
37

R. Douglas Elliott, “Fringe Benefits: Class Actions for Marginalized People in Canada”
(2011) 53 S.C.L.R. (2d) 221, at 228. See also W.A. Bogart’s discussion of American legal
exceptionalism and reliance on private litigation in Consequences: The Impact of Law and Its
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Second, several jurisprudential barriers to constitutional class actions developed
early on in class action law. A line of cases starting with an obiter comment in
Guimond v. Quebec (Attorney General) held that a class action was not appropriate
where the main relief sought was a declaration of constitutional invalidity.38 Courts
have rejected class actions on this basis, stating that test case litigation would
achieve the same ends at less cost and in shorter time.39 Relatedly, the Supreme
Court has also held that a section 52 remedy of a declaration of unconstitutionality
could not be coupled with damages under section 24(1) of the Charter.40 As
explained below, the unavailability of damages renders such constitutional challenges financially non-viable for class action litigators who work on a contingency
fee basis. And finally, the Mackin principle has created an effective immunity from
civil liability flowing from the enforcement of law subsequently found to be
unconstitutional; under this principle, “duly enacted laws should be enforced until
declared invalid, unless the state conduct under the law was clearly wrong, in bad
faith or an abuse of power”.41
Third, there are practical barriers to constitutional class actions. Class action
litigation is inherently entrepreneurial; it depends on the willingness of lawyers to
take on complex cases, almost always on a contingency fee basis, and to prosecute
them against well-resourced defendants, with no guarantee of success. As a result,
the size of the potential damage claim is a critical factor for determining which cases
class counsel will take on, because the quantum is directly proportionate to the
prospective contingency fee. This economic reality means that the public interest
value of a potential action is not a controlling consideration for these specialist
lawyers, and that Charter cases, where the availability of any damages is uncertain,
have been particularly unattractive.42
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Vancouver (City) v. Ward was cause for
Complexity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), at 111-52.
38

[1996] S.C.J. No. 91, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347, 138 D.L.R. (4th) 647 (S.C.C.). See also
Joseph Arvay & David Wu, “Class Actions and the Charter” (Paper delivered at the 14th
National Symposium on Class Actions, Toronto, April 6-7, 2017), at 19-20 [unpublished].
The Supreme Court of Canada later tempered the rule in Guimond, by stating that courts have
the discretion to allow a class proceeding in lieu of judicial review in Manuge v. Canada,
[2010] S.C.J. No. 67, 2010 SCC 67 (S.C.C.), a s. 15 Charter case by members of the Canadian
Forces.
39

Davis v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] N.J. No. 280, 2008 NLCA 49 (N.L.C.A.);
Roach v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] O.J. No. 737, 185 C.R.R. (2d) 215 (Ont. S.C.J.).
40

Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, 93 D.L.R. (4th) 1
(S.C.C.).
41

Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 13, 2002 SCC 13,
at para. 78 (S.C.C.).
42

For a discussion of the ramifications of the entrepreneurial model for access to justice,
see Jasminka Kalajdzic, Class Actions in Canada: The Promise and Reality of Access to
Justice (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2018), at 86-89.

39

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

renewed optimism regarding constitutional class actions because it held the promise
of overcoming these economic barriers.43 The Court for the first time held that
compensatory damages may be awarded pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter. In
Ward, the Chief Justice outlined a four-step framework to determine the state’s
liability for Charter damages:
The first step in the inquiry is to establish that a Charter right has been breached.
The second step is to show why damages are a just and appropriate remedy, having
regard to whether they would fulfill one or more of the related functions of
compensation, vindication of the right, and/or deterrence of future breaches. At the
third step, the state has the opportunity to demonstrate, if it can, that countervailing
factors defeat the functional considerations that support a damage award and render
damages inappropriate or unjust. The final step is to assess the quantum of the
damages.44

Once the plaintiff has established the first two steps (a Charter breach and the
functional need for damages), the onus shifts to the defendant for the last two steps.
“Countervailing factors” include the availability of another remedy to effectively
address the Charter breach (such as a declaratory judgment) or concerns for good
governance.45 “Good governance” refers to any number of policy factors that will
justify restricting the state’s exposure to civil liability unless the state conduct meets
a minimum threshold of gravity.46 In determining the quantum of damages, courts
are to arrive at a figure that is fair to both the plaintiff and the state, and “may take
into account the public interest in good governance, the danger of deterring
governments from undertaking beneficial new policies and programs, and the need
to avoid diverting large sums of funds from public programs to private interests”.47
Ward was not a class action. The plaintiff was a lawyer who was unlawfully
strip-searched and then ultimately awarded $5,000 under section 24(1). The Court’s
recognition of a “distinct remedy of constitutional damages”,48 however, created the
financial incentive entrepreneurial class counsel needed to take on a Charter class
action. In cases where large numbers of people are subject to the same conduct that
is ultimately determined to violate their Charter rights, constitutional damages, even
if individually modest, could be significant in the aggregate, and thus justify the risk
and expense of a class action.
Post-Ward Charter class actions, however, have not been entirely predictable. The
43
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most significant cleavage exists between the line of cases following the British
Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Thorburn v. British Columbia (Public Safety
and Solicitor General)49 and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Good v.
Toronto (City) Police Services Board.50 In Thorburn, the court rejected a proposed
class action by individuals who had been strip-searched pursuant to a policy at the
Vancouver city jail on the basis that the section 8 Charter right is individual in nature
and therefore not amenable to class-wide determination: “[A] finding of a s. 8
Charter violation as a result of an unreasonable search of one class member will not
found a similar finding for another class member as a finding of an unreasonable
search is dependent on a multitude of variable circumstances unique to each class
member.”51 The argument that this, and perhaps all, Charter rights are individual
would effectively immunize governments from class action lawsuits.
As both a matter of law and policy, the decision in Thorburn strikes many
commentators as simply wrong.52 Indeed, the reasoning of both the Divisional Court
and Court of Appeal in Good, a certified Charter class action on behalf of G20
protestors, is persuasive and has been followed by courts in Ontario and elsewhere.53 In Good, the courts confirmed that not all issues of liability have to be
capable of class-wide resolution to justify certification; this is consistent with many
other class actions involving negligence claims, where only some elements of the
cause of action can be evaluated collectively.54 More importantly, the courts held
that Charter breaches caused by policies, rules or blanket orders are capable of class
treatment because they focus on the conduct of the defendant. “When a systemic
wrong causes harm to an undifferentiated class of individuals, it can be entirely
49
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proper to use a class proceeding that focuses on the alleged wrong.”55 Subsequent
cases on behalf of incarcerated persons subject to blanket policies of either strip
searches or administrative segregation, all seeking Charter damages, applied Good
and were certified.56
Good and its progeny thus breathe life back into the Charter class action as a tool
of public interest litigation. More to the point, they create opportunities to structure
constitutional climate change litigation as class proceedings.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE CLASS ACTIONS
There is a rich and diverse scholarship on the use of domestic courts and
constitutional arguments to enforce climate justice.57 The unwinding of environmental regulations by some states and toothless commitments to curb emissions by
others, coupled with the inability to hold states accountable at the international level,
have led to increasing recourse to the courts. As Fournier succinctly notes, “climate
change litigation in national courts provides the possibility for individuals with
substantially less power to be on an equal footing with the state”.58
This notion of using court processes to level the playing field between the haves
and the have-nots is familiar to class action scholars and lawyers. In its seminal
Report on Class Actions, the Ontario Law Reform Commission explained the need
for a class action procedure in our highly complex, interdependent society
characterized by “mass manufacturing, mass promotion, and mass consumption”, all
55
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of which can injure large numbers of people.59 In the wake of such misconduct, “the
individual is very often unable or unwilling to stand alone in meaningful opposition”.60 Class actions, the report concluded, serve an important social and access to
justice function: by overcoming barriers to the courts, class actions may “provide an
antidote to the social frustration that exists where neither courts nor administrative
agencies are able to protect the rights of citizens on an individual basis”.61 Chief
Justice McLachlin echoed these sentiments in Western Canadian Shopping Centres
Inc. v. Dutton, when she proclaimed that “[w]ithout class actions, the doors of
justice remain closed to some plaintiffs, however strong their legal claims”.62
Despite its ambition, however, the class action mechanism has not been effective
in pursuing environmental claims anywhere in Canada except Quebec.63 In Ontario,
for example, only 16 environmental class actions were filed between 1993 and 2018;
six failed, eight settled and two are ongoing.64 By comparison, 67 environmental
class actions were filed in Quebec in roughly the same time period, and all but 15
were certified. The biggest impediments are issues of underlying substantive law
and evidence.65 In the common law provinces, litigants often found their claims on
negligence, nuisance and trespass and seek the tort measure of damages.66 From the
perspective of class action procedure, tort causes of action force courts to focus on
individual aspects of the problem, making certification more difficult.67 Moreover,
proof of harm can be very difficult in cases of toxic torts, and the evidentiary
challenges of individualized assessments of damages will usually defeat certifica59
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tion.68
So why would climate change class actions fare any better? The key is in the
framing of these cases as constitutional challenges rather than environmental law
violations or tort claims.69 The rights turn in climate change litigation70 is precisely
what makes these cases amenable to collective action.
To proceed as a class action rather than an individual test case or multi-party
action, the plaintiff must move for certification. The certification test is essentially
the same in all provinces in that five requirements must be met: (a) the pleadings
must disclose a cause of action; (b) there is an identifiable class; (c) there are
common issues of fact or law; (d) a class action would be preferable to other
alternative methods of resolving the common issues; and (e) there is an adequate
representative plaintiff to represent the interests of the class.71 Despite the plaintiffs’
defeat in ENJEU, there are good reasons to believe that certification of a climate
change class action is possible.
1.

Justiciability

As with other Charter-based litigation, justiciability is an immediate concern in a
climate change class action. Justiciability is ultimately concerned with “the
appropriate role of courts as the forum for the resolution of different types of
disputes”.72 The doctrine is susceptible, however, to being relied upon to avoid
addressing issues that are novel, complex or politically controversial.73
The question of whether the federal government’s actions to combat climate
68
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change violate the Charter is undoubtedly novel, complex and politically charged.
The Supreme Court of Canada has determined, however, that as long as an issue has
a legal component, and is therefore not a purely political question, the dispute will
be considered justiciable.74 In the absence of a privative clause that explicitly ousts
judicial review, it is for the courts to determine the justiciability of a particular
issue.75
In ENJEU, Morrison J. rejected the Attorney General’s justiciability arguments
because the plaintiffs sought a finding that the failure of Canada to act sufficiently
to regulate GHGs was a violation of their Charter rights to life, liberty and security
of the person. The claim that the government’s actions engaged section 7 was
determinative of the justiciability question:
Jeunesse’s claims regarding Canada’s choices and decisions appear to be, at this
stage, aiming at the exercise of executive power, while the order sought to stop any
violation of fundamental rights, according to the respondent, seems to be linked to
the legislative process.
Courts generally do not interfere in the exercise of executive power. But in the case
of an alleged violation of the rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, a court
should not decline jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of justiciability.

. . .
Even in the exercise of the Royal Prerogative powers, courts may intervene to
decide whether there is a violation of the Canadian Charter because “all government power must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution”.76

Justice Morrison added that judicial review in the Charter context should not be
restricted only to government acts – it can potentially include instances of
government inactivity as well. In Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of
Education),77 for example, the Supreme Court of Canada intervened as a result of
government inaction. On this basis, to the extent that a plaintiff’s main allegation is
that the government has not done enough to combat climate change, the claim
remains justiciable. In any event, both ENJEU and the two non-class climate change
74
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actions (the Wet’suwet’en action78 and La Rose79) all allege that the federal
government’s actions cause, contribute to and allow a level of GHG emissions
incompatible with a sustainable climate. Specifically, it is alleged that the defendants
“actively participate in and support the development, expansion and operation of
industries and activities involving fossil fuels that emit a level of GHGs incompatible with a Stable Climate System”.80
There are good justiciability arguments, therefore, for a climate change action
brought on the basis that government activity contributes to the dangerous
destabilization of the climate, thereby depriving the proposed class members of their
rights under the Charter.
2.

Cause of Action

In addition to justiciability, a certification motion judge must be satisfied that the
pleadings disclose a cause of action. No evidence is admissible on this part of the
test. Courts use the same approach as on a motion to strike: assuming all facts
pleaded to be true, is it plain and obvious that the plaintiff’s claim cannot succeed.81
This criterion is not a high hurdle. Courts are to take a generous approach and have
ruled consistently that “the novelty of the cause of action will not militate against the
plaintiff”.82
Quebec’s certification test includes a slightly different criterion: the court must be
satisfied that the action bears a “serious colour of right”.83 The requirement is one
of pleading — the factual allegations must be sufficiently specific to support a prima
facie case against the defendant.84
The central contention in a constitutional climate change action is that the
“stability of the climate system is profoundly connected to children’s basic health
78
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and development (or security of the person) and to a child’s survival (or life
interest)”.85 There is scientific consensus about the existence, causes and impacts of
climate change (including death, illness, loss of land, food insecurity and psychological injury), and the role of states in generating GHGs. These impacts are
exacerbated for Indigenous persons who rely on a stable climate to meaningfully
engage in traditional practices and cultural rights and who are disproportionally and
more seriously affected than the general population.86 These section 7 arguments
have been thoroughly and persuasively canvassed by Nathalie Chalifour and Jessica
Earle,87 David Wu,88 and Lynda Collins,89 among others. Their arguments confirm
that, for the purposes of certification, it is “not plain and obvious” that the plaintiff’s
claim cannot succeed.
3.

Identifiable Class

The second criterion for certification is that there is an identifiable class of two or
more persons to be represented by the representative plaintiff.90 The evidentiary
burden for this and the remaining certification criteria is much lower than the
balance of probabilities; the plaintiff must merely show “some basis in fact” that the
criterion has been met.91 The class definition will determine the size of the class and
85

La Rose et al. v. Canada (Statement of Claim), at para. 224, online: <http://blogs2.
law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/
2019/20191025_T-1750-19_complaint.pdf>.
86

La Rose et al. v. Canada (Statement of Claim), at para. 227, online: <http://blogs2.
law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/
2019/20191025_T-1750-19_complaint.pdf>.
Several authors have made the argument that Indigenous claimants have particularly strong
ss. 7 and 15 arguments given their unique relationships to the land and their location in areas
that are especially vulnerable to climate changes: Andrew Stobo Sniderman & Adam
Shedletzky, “Aboriginal Peoples and Legal Challenges to Canadian Climate Change Policy”
(2014) 4 W.J. Legal Stud. 1, at 2-3; Cameron Jefferies, “Filling the Gaps in Canada’s Climate
Change Strategy: All Litigation, All the Time” (2015) 38 Fordham Intl. L.J. 1371, at 1393-95.
87

Nathalie J. Chalifour & Jessica Earle, “Feeling the Heat: Climate Litigation Under the
Canadian Charter’s Right to Life, Liberty, and Security of the Person” (2018) 42:4 Vermont
L. Rev. 689, at 704.
88

David Wu, “Embedding Environmental Rights in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter:
Resolving the Tension Between the Need for Precaution and the Need for Harm” (2014) 33
N.J.C.L. 191, at 205.
89

Lynda M. Collins, “Safeguarding the Longue Durée: Environmental Rights in the
Canadian Constitution” (2015) 71:20 The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases Conference.
90

Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 5(1)(b); Code of Civil
Procedure, CQLR, c. C-25.01, art. 571.
91

Sun-Rype Products Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., [2013] S.C.J. No. 58, 2013
SCC 58, at paras. 52-76 (S.C.C.).

47

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

who is bound by the litigation. It is interconnected with the proposed common issues
and influences the manageability of the action. The class definition must be
objective and cannot arbitrarily exclude people who share the same interest in the
resolution of the common issues.92
Although the identifiable class criterion is usually not an onerous requirement and
few class actions are rejected on this criterion alone,93 it is what caused the Quebec
court to refuse to certify ENJEU. While Morrison J. did not dispute that Quebec
youth will suffer greater violations of their rights than older generations, he found
the cut-off of 35 years old to be arbitrary.94 The plaintiffs chose this definition,
however, because it corresponded with the definition of youth used by Statistics
Canada.95 In addition, there is a rational connection between the proposed class and
the central factual issue in both the section 7 and section 15 Charter claim: global
warming is likely to reach 1.5˚C above pre-industrial levels between 2030 and 2052
if it continues to increase at the current rate, resulting in extreme temperatures in
many regions, increased flooding in coastal regions and greater frequency of
droughts in others.96 Thus, it is plausible to argue that the government’s contributions to this trend disproportionately impact the lives, liberties and security of
younger generations, and to identify the class as such.
Justice Morrison also rejected the class definition on another basis: he stated that
class members under the age of 18 are not fully capable of exercising their civil
rights, and that their parents, therefore, would have to act on their behalf in the
litigation. He concluded that a representative plaintiff does not have the authority to
92
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force millions of parents to do so.97 To impose as a precondition to class
membership that children have litigation guardians, however, is to effectively
exclude children from the class action device altogether. This blanket exclusion is
contrary to the central access to justice objective of class actions, inconsistent with
the jurisprudence in the rest of Canada, and not supported by a plain reading of the
class action provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.98
The Supreme Court has recognized that non-economic barriers to justice make
litigation all but impossible for some vulnerable groups, such as persons with
disabilities or psychological injuries.99 Children, by virtue of being children, face
unique barriers to justice that a representative action can overcome. Precisely
because they cannot engage in the political process — but will bear the consequences of voters’ choices now — children need access to the court system more
than most. They should not be forced to bring individual lawsuits, any more than
institutional abuse survivors should be forced to bring their own claims. Justice
Morrison’s decision to deny certification, in part, because the action involves
children may violate Canada’s international legal commitments.100
Moreover, the decision in ENJEU is inconsistent with class action precedent.
Class actions often include class members who are minors or without capacity. For
example, lawsuits that include subclasses for siblings and children with Family Law
Act claims for loss of care, guidance and companionship are routinely certified.101
Institutional abuse cases and actions against child welfare authorities have been
97
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certified on behalf of class members who, if they were named plaintiffs, would need
litigation guardians.102 In 2016, an Ontario court certified on consent an action
where the proposed class consisted of the 6,200 children who resided at or were
inpatients of the Children’s Psychiatric Research Institute up to 2011.103 In none of
these actions did the court refuse to certify on the basis that the class was partially
comprised of people not legally competent to sue on their own.
There are also practical reasons to doubt the correctness of Morrison J.’s decision.
The nature of a representative action is such that class members do not have the full
panoply of litigation rights that named parties possess. While it is true that a
representative plaintiff must be legally competent, and therefore have a litigation
guardian if they lack the capacity to sue on their own, a class member is not a
“party” to the litigation.104 Class members do not have the right to hire, fire or
instruct counsel; to participate in settlement negotiations; or to appeal approved
settlements.105 The representative plaintiff is the true client of class counsel, charged
with protecting the best interests of the class. It is redundant, therefore, to impose
as an additional layer of representation the requirement that minor class members all
have litigation guardians as a precondition to certification. And while Morrison J. is
correct that the representative plaintiff is “forcing” parents to act on their children’s
behalf if they wish to exercise any of the limited litigation rights possessed by class
members, this is the consequence of all opt-out class action systems. Individuals
who fall within the definition of the class are compelled to act in order to remove
themselves from the litigation, but are automatically bound by the action if they do
nothing. The number of class members who opt out of Canadian class actions is
negligible,106 and Morrison J.’s concern about imposing on parents, therefore, is
theoretical at best.
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4.

Common Issues

Class action legislation requires class members to raise common issues of fact or
law. An issue is not “common” unless it is a “substantial ingredient” of each class
member’s claim.107 The class action device is justified when it will avoid
duplication of fact-finding or legal analysis.108 The common issues need not resolve
the litigation to justify class treatment, nor does the existence of many individual
issues (such as the assessment of damages) preclude certification.109
As previously discussed, some constitutional class actions have floundered on the
common issues test because courts concluded that Charter rights are inherently
individual in nature and that violations and remedies, therefore, cannot be
determined on a common basis.110 Recent successes in the G20 and administrative
segregation cases, however, suggest that courts are prepared to find that alleged
breaches of section 7 and other rights raise common issues because they relate to the
operational methods and policies of the government. “[T]he case law offers many
examples where class actions have been certified to determine claims where all class
members are exposed to the same conduct of the defendant.”111
In some ways, climate change raises quintessentially common issues. The focus
of the plaintiffs’ charge is solely on the defendant government’s conduct. Climate
change is devastating precisely because it is not localized. While the impact on class
members may vary in degree based on geography, economic status, Indigeneity or
health, there is a baseline of harm common to all. Although Ward held that section
24(1) damages depend on the facts of each case, non-pecuniary damages can still be
assessed in the aggregate, as is expressly permitted under class proceedings
legislation.112
It is true that the jurisprudence on the availability of damages is complicated.
Schachter v. Canada113 provides that damages under section 24(1) are not normally
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available in an action for a declaration of invalidity. Mackin v. New Brunswick
(Minister of Finance)114 states that there is an exception for conduct that is “clearly
wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power”. Under the Ward test, a government could
argue that a multi-billion-dollar damage award would be inconsistent with good
governance. On the other hand, a significant damage award is precisely what is
required to vindicate the harm done to society and to deter future breaches by state
actors (two of the three objectives of constitutional damages).115 That the plaintiff
in ENJEU specifically requested that any assessed damages be paid cy-près to the
government for the purpose of funding climate change initiatives makes the case for
commonality stronger, since there is then no need to identify and locate each
individual class member.116 Ultimately, however, certification is not a test of the
merits of the case but only a determination of whether there are common issues
justifying representative litigation. Issues of liability alone would be sufficient to
satisfy commonality.
5.

Preferable Procedure

The fourth certification criterion, preferability, has two components. The motion
judge assesses whether the proposed class action: (1) would be a fair, efficient and
manageable method to advance the claim; and (2) would be preferable to other
reasonably available means to resolve the common issues.117 This analysis must
include reference to the accepted goals of class actions: judicial economy, access to
justice and behaviour modification.118 Of the stated goals of class actions,
modification of the wrongful behaviour of the defendant and those similarly situated
is particularly apposite in the climate change context.
Arguments that a class action is not an efficient method of advancing the claims
are unlikely to be successful. The complex science of climate change could be more
efficiently mounted in a single action than in a multitude of individual ones. While
there may be individual issues relating the impact of climate change on different
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members of the class, the resolution of several factual issues (e.g., whether the
government has failed to meet GHG reduction targets and the consequences of this
failure) and legal ones (e.g., whether the failure to put in place necessary measures
to limit global warming to 1.5˚C constitutes a violation of section 7) will
substantially advance each member’s claim. Thus, the manageability branch of the
preferable procedure test should be met.
The comparative branch of the analysis may be more challenging. Here, the court
will look at alternative processes that are “realistically” available to the class
members.119 The government’s main argument is likely to be that a test case would
be more efficient and achieve the main objective, declarations of constitutional
violations. Permissive public interest standing rules would allow environmental
groups, for example, to bring Charter claims seeking systemic remedies.120
Plaintiffs have successfully resisted this argument in other class actions on the basis
that, unlike in a test case, compensation is available in a class action.121 The Court
of Appeal for Ontario has also held that the combination of remedies — a
declaration of a Charter violation and damages — “would be stronger instruments
of behaviour modification”.122 ENJEU’s unusual request that the damages awarded
be used instead for measures to curb global warming123 will have an uncertain
impact on preferability. A court could either interpret the requested relief as a more
explicit form of behaviour modification (thus consistent with Good) or proof that
declaratory relief, not compensation, is the class members’ true objective. The
plaintiff will have to address whether quantifying a sum of money that must be spent
on climate initiatives, without dictating precisely how it is to be done, is sufficiently
respectful of the separation of powers.
6.

Representative Plaintiff

The final certification criterion is the determination that there is a suitable
representative plaintiff to bring the action on behalf of class members. The proposed
representative must not have any conflicts of interest on the common issues, must
have a workable litigation plan, and must be willing to vigorously and capably
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prosecute the interests of the class.124 In Quebec, public interest groups like
ENvironnement JEUnesse are permitted to stand as representative plaintiffs.125 In
the rest of Canada, the representative must be a juridical person with a cause of
action against the defendant.126
This criterion is not difficult to meet and rarely results in rejection of the class
proceeding. In a public interest case like climate change litigation, it would be
especially easy to satisfy a judge that the proposed representatives have the
motivation and will to vigorously prosecute the action. Youth climate actions
consistently rely on a dozen or more plaintiffs who are diverse and representative of
the many communities impacted by climate change: Indigenous, living in coastal
regions or drought zones, impacted by wildfires or flooding, and suffering from
illnesses caused by extreme heat and polluted air.127 A similar cross-section of
proposed representative plaintiffs represented by capable class counsel would
almost certainly satisfy the final component of the certification test.
V. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
ACTION MECHANISM

OF

USING

THE

CLASS

With climate change litigation ramping up in Canada, it is likely that many
procedures and theories will be tested. There are advantages to including class
actions in this multi-pronged litigation strategy. What follows is a brief discussion
of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of class actions relative to
traditional public interest litigation.
1.

Advantages

There are both legal and practical advantages to using class actions. The legal
advantages relate to the unique provisions of class action statutes that permit the use
of statistical evidence and assessment of aggregate damages. A court may dispense
with calculating individual damages for each class member by authorizing an
aggregate assessment of the defendant’s liability, and then determining how the
aggregate award is to be distributed.128 Class action legislation in most provinces
124
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also allows the use of statistical evidence that would otherwise not be admissible in
order to determine an appropriate way to distribute any monetary award.129 The
aggregate damage provision was successfully invoked by the class in Good.130
As discussed in the preceding section, the availability of cy-près distributions of
damages also obviates the need to seek an order requiring the government to make
budget allocations, relief that would likely be denied as not justiciable.131 Although
the difference between the two forms of relief is subtle, if not semantic, a class
action judge familiar with the use of cy-près might be amenable to the argument.
Finally, in some provinces and in the Federal Court, class actions operate on a
no-costs basis.132 The risk of adverse costs has stalled environmental class actions
in Ontario. Litigating in the Federal Court or in a province where there is no such
risk is a distinct advantage over traditional test case litigation, where advance costs
orders or relief from adverse costs can be unpredictable.133
There are also distinct practical advantages to a class action. These cases are
financed by sophisticated lawyers working on contingency fees.134 Engaging class
action specialists widens the pool of lawyers doing public interest work. The
evidentiary burden at the certification motion is low, but the benefits of achieving
certification can be significant. For one, the mere fact of certification raises public
awareness of the case and its claims. Second, certification increases settlement
leverage exponentially.135 Settlements of class actions are not limited by the relief
that a court has the jurisdiction to grant; many high-profile class action settlements
have included apologies, the creation of foundations and truth commissions, and the
compensation of novel claims. In effect, settlement negotiations offer unique
129
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opportunities for climate justice lawyers to fashion remedies that would normally be
associated with the political process.
2.

Disadvantages

The novel use of cy-près proposed in ENJEU is the main legal risk to using class
actions that is not present in ordinary litigation. Cy-près usually involves the
distribution of class action settlement funds to a third party like a charitable
organization. In effect, the plaintiffs in ENJEU are seeking to give the money back
to the defendant, albeit earmarked for climate change initiatives. Such relief is
unprecedented.136 A judge could not dictate exactly how the money must be spent
without running afoul of the caution in Doucet-Boudreau that courts must not
“depart unduly or unnecessarily from their role of adjudicating disputes and granting
remedies that address the matter of those disputes”.137 While a negotiated settlement
would give the parties the freedom to craft a plan to utilize funds for climate change
mitigation purposes, a judge awarding damages at trial might not have the authority
to do so. This uncertainty, coupled with the still-nascent remedy of constitutional
damages, creates further risk for class action litigators performing a cost-benefit
analysis in their selection of cases.
There are also two main practical disadvantages to pursuing climate change
litigation by way of a class action. The first is that a class action requires a motion
for certification, an additional procedural step that is expensive and time-consuming.
Success, of course, is not guaranteed. Second, the novelty of climate change
litigation in Canada creates risk for class action specialists, so they may prefer to
have a source of third party funding (commercial or the non-profit alternatives in
Quebec and Ontario138) than to self-finance. Commercial funders may also be
dissuaded by the uncertainty of large damage awards in climate change litigation.
While not-for-profit funding entities would be attracted to the public interest value
of such litigation, the significant cost of expert evidence and the prospect of
136
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exposure to large adverse costs in the event the case fails at certification or trial
would be weighty considerations.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is an axiom in class action law that class proceedings are procedural and do
not alter the substantive law. It is no longer gospel, however, as increasingly
commentators and judges observe that class actions have substantive law implications.139 As Karakatsanis J. noted in her dissent in a price-fixing class action:
[W]hile class actions are a procedural vehicle, they are not merely procedural. They
make possible claims that are very complex or could not be prosecuted individually,
not only because it would be inefficient or unaffordable, but also because it may be
extremely difficult to prove individual claims. The CPA does have substantive
implications: it creates a remedy that recognizes that damages to the class as a
whole can be proven, even when proof of individual members’ damages is
impractical, and that is available even if those who are not members of the class can
benefit.140

Justice Karakatsanis was referring to the availability of cy-près distributions in
class action settlements where it is not possible to allocate or pay compensation to
individual class members. While some critics complain that permitting class
members’ compensation to be paid to a third party is the equivalent of a civil fine
and creates a remedy that is not available in non-class litigation, courts routinely
approve such payments in order to further the deterrence objective of class
actions.141 Charter damages and climate change litigation also share this fundamental objective. These are the synergies tapped by a constitutional climate change class
action.
The concept of a class proceeding as an altogether different kind of litigation —
not just a tool for aggregating many individual claims — is under-theorized in
Canada.142 Climate change litigation exposes the need for re-conceptualizing the
class action to facilitate “collective rights that cannot be vindicated solely by
139
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upholding individual rights”.143 In the meantime, however, there are good reasons
to pursue climate change litigation using the Charter class action vehicle, despite its
current shortcomings. Recent successes in Ontario and the continued development
of constitutional damages as a remedy bode well for climate change class actions
using a Charter framework. As mapped out in Part IV, the arguments for certifying
such an action have a realistic chance of success.
The certification of a climate change action is not a guarantee that the case will
succeed on the merits. A certified class action faces the same doctrinal and policy
challenges as any other form of climate change litigation. But, certification itself is
an important victory. It improves the power disparity between citizens and the state
and focuses the trial on a set of discrete factual and legal common issues. Successful
findings on any one of these issues advances the cause of climate justice. Moreover,
certified class actions yield considerable settlement leverage and tend to generate
more media attention and public awareness than a typical judicial review application
or individual test case.144 These are not insignificant advantages in a climate change
litigation agenda, in which the basic goal is to create political pressure to generate
wiser climate policy.
I began this paper by pointing out the ironies of the decisions in Juliana and in
ENJEU. There is, of course, a bigger irony in climate change itself — that “those
who have done the least to cause climate change are the ones facing its most dire
impacts”.145 The failure of states to take meaningful steps to curb GHG emissions
leaves citizens with few options, and accounts for the rise of rights-based climate
change litigation in recent years. As Canadian advocates join with their international
counterparts in deploying a litigation strategy, Canada’s robust class action
procedure may be a useful addition in the pursuit of collective climate justice.
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